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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
I. POLLUTION CONTROL ACT HELD NOT RETROACTIVE
Section 48-1-90 of the South Carolina Pollution Control
Act1 provides in pertinent part: "(a) It shall be unlawful for any
person... to throw, drain, run, allow to seep or otherwise dis-
charge into the environment .. .organic or inorganic matter,
* . .except as in compliance with a permit issued by the Depart-
ment [of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC)]." 2 In Car-
olina Chemicals, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Health
& Environmental Controls the South Carolina Court of Appeals
construed section 48-1-90 as imposing liability on those persons
who control or have a right to control the discharge of pollu-
tants." In addition, while ruling that the liability created in sec-
tion 48-1-90 could not be imposed retroactively on a disposer of
wastes, the court indicated that liability for the continuing ef-
fects of past conduct could be established on other legal theories
or on different facts.5
In 1949 Carolina Chemicals moved to property on the pe-
rimeter of what is now the Columbia Metropolitan Airport (Air-
port). Carolina Chemicals blended chemicals purchased from
other manufacturers to make agricultural pesticides. These
chemicals were shipped to Carolina Chemicals in paper bags and
drum containers which, after being emptied, were discarded un-
til 1962.6
After a DHEC inspection of the Airport site in 1980, DHEC
cited Carolina Chemicals and the Airport for violations of sec-
tion 48-1-90.7 Specifically, DHEC contended that the continuing
1. Pollution Control Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-10 to -350 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-90 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
3. 290 S.C. 498, 351 S.E.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1986).
4. Id. at 506-07, 351 S.E.2d at 580.
5. Id. at 507, 351 S.E.2d at 580.
6. Id. at 500, 351 S.E.2d at 576-77. Since there was no regular waste disposal ser-
vice in the area, Carolina Chemicals and the Airport entered into a contract which per-
mitted Carolina Chemicals to dispose of its waste at a site on the Airport's property for a
monthly fee of $25. The arrangement lasted until 1962, when Carolina Chemicals ceased
all dumping at the Airport site. Id.
7. Id. at 500-01, 351 S.E.2d at 577; Record at 6-7.
1
Raeker: Environmental Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1987
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
seepage of pesticide chemical wastes at the Airport site consti-
tuted a present violation of section 48-1-90 and that Carolina
Chemicals was responsible for the violation by "allowing" the
chemicals to seep.8
The court of appeals rejected DHEC's interpretation of sec-
tion 48-1-90, concluding that "[tihe wording of Section 48-1-90
implies that a person violating the statute is one who, directly or
indirectly, controls or has a right to control the discharge."9 The
court found that because Carolina Chemicals plainly intended to
abandon all interest in or control over the containers when it
discarded its waste at the Airport site, and because it acquired
no interest in the real property used for disposal, Carolina
Chemicals did not control or have a right to control the dis-
charged waste. Therefore, Carolina Chemicals was not presently
violating section 48-1-90.10
Alternatively, DHEC maintained that section 48-1-90
should be applied retroactively because the conduct of Carolina
Chemicals during the period from 1958 to 1962 constituted ei-
ther a common-law nuisance or a violation of 1950 S.C. Acts
873.11 Citing three reasons, the court of appeals refused to apply
section 48-1-90 retroactively. First, DHEC had cited Carolina
Chemicals for a violation of section 48-1-90, not for a common-
law nuisance or violation of 1950 S.C. Acts 873.12 Second, not
only had Carolina Chemicals never been found liable for creat-
ing a common-law nuisance, but also DHEC's own hearing of-
ficer found that the company had never violated any statutes or
regulations in force when it disposed of the containers." Finally
and probably most importantly, the court of appeals found that
8. Brief of Secondary Appellant at 7.
9. 290 S.C. at 503, 351 S.E.2d at 578. The court stated that "[Jifl we were to inter-
pret the statute with the same literalmindedness as the Department, all the world would
be violating the statute, since no one is taking affirmative steps to stop leaching from the
containers." Id.
10. Id. The court found the Airport liable under § 48-1-90, however, since the Air-
port had "present ownership of the land and the present right of disposition and control
over the discarded containers." Id. at 506, 351 S.E.2d at 580.
11. Id. at 504, 351 S.E.2d at 579. Act of May 4, 1950, 1950 S.C. Acts 873, which was
in effect during the time Carolina Chemicals dumped its containers, provided in perti-
nent part: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to throw, drain, run
or otherwise discharge into any waters of this State ... organic or inorganic matter that
shall cause or tend to cause a condition of pollution in contravention of the standards
adopted by the Authority." 1950 S.C. Acts 873, § 8.
12. 290 S.C. at 505, 351 S.E.2d at 579.
13. Id. at 504, 351 S.E.2d at 579; see also Record at 310.
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section 48-1-90 created a substantive liability that did not exist
in 1962 when Carolina Chemicals last disposed of its contain-
ers.14 Without a clear mandate from the legislature, the court of
appeals refused to hold Carolina Chemicals in violation of a stat-
utory or regulatory duty which did not exist at the time the con-
tainers were discarded.
15
Although the court of appeals refused to apply section 48-1-
90 retroactively, the court emphasized that Carolina Chemicals
"should not be read to suggest there can never be liability for
the continuing effects of past conduct under other legal theories
or on different facts."' 6 Because the court of appeals did not fur-
ther explain the meaning of this dictum, one is left to speculate
about the available means of imposing liability on waste dispos-
ers or generators who complied with the then-existing pollution
statutes and regulations, but whose past conduct would have vi-
olated modern waste disposal laws. The court could have meant
that section 48-1-90 does not supplant previous statutory or
common-law causes of action. 7 This interpretation can be in-
ferred from the court's observation that Carolina Chemicals had
never been found liable for creating a common-law nuisance or
14. 290 S.C. at 505, 351 S.E.2d at 579. While the court seemed to assume that the
strict liability of § 48-1-90 became effective on April 29, 1970, a comparison of Act of
April 29, 1970, 1970 S.C. Acts 1157, §§ 1(7) & 13, with Act of July 9, 1973, 1973 S.C. Acts
446, § 1, shows that a finding of liability under the 1970 act was still dependent upon a
showing that the discharge was in contravention of the standards of the Pollution Con-
trol Authority and thus was not strict liability. It was not until adoption of Act of June
4, 1975, 1975 S.C. Acts 203, § 6, that liability was established merely by showing that the
discharge did not comply with the permitting requirements.
15. 290 S.C. at 507, 351 S.E.2d at 580. Even when there is clear legislative intent
that a statute be given retroactive effect, many courts will not apply the statute retroac-
tively when to do so would lead to unjust results. See American Fly Ash Co. v. County of
Tazewell, 120 Ill. App. 3d 57, 457 N.E.2d 1069 (1983); Department of Envtl. Protection v.
Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983).
16. 290 S.C. at 507, 351 S.E.2d at 580. In fact, a federal district court jury later
ordered Carolina Chemicals to pay for clean-up costs incurred at the Airport site. The
court found Carolina Chemicals liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1982). The State, April 18,
1987, at B1, col. 5.
17. Common-law causes of action in South Carolina include negligence, nuisance,
and injury to riparian rights. See Fisher & Gaston, Pollution Control Practice in South
Carolina-An Overview, 23 S.C.L. REv. 723 (1971). For a discussion of other common-law
causes of action, see Baurer, Love Canal: Common Law Approaches to a Modern Trag-
edy, 11 ENvTL. L. 133 (1980) and Note, An Analysis of Common Law and Statutory
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of violating 1950 S.C. Acts 873.18
Alternatively, Carolina Chemicals may leave open the pos-
sibility of a retroactive application of section 48-1-90. If DHEC
could show that the past conduct of a waste disposer would have
constituted a violation of section 48-1-90 had the conduct oc-
curred after April 29, 1970,18 and that the waste disposer
breached an affirmative duty at the time of the conduct, 0 an
action might lie for violation of the statute. This interpretation
would be advantageous to DHEC because it would allow DHEC
to circumvent the statute of limitations defense-a defense
which could preclude a suit by DHEC in cases such as Carolina
Chemicals when the conduct took place in 1962. Additionally,
this interpretation would allow selective retroactive application
of section 48-1-90 while obviating the inequity of punishing
waste disposers for conduct which was completely lawful at the
time of its occurrence.21
Although the court of appeals never unequivocally stated
that section 48-1-90 could never be applied to conduct predating
April 29, 1970, the court did make clear that persons who con-
trol or have a right to control waste dump sites may be liable
under section 48-1-90 regardless of whether they generated or
disposed of the waste.22
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18. 290 S.C. at 504, 351 S.E.2d at 579. It seems unlikely that the court was merely
pointing out that § 48-1-90 is not an exclusive remedy since the Pollution Control Act
states that it does not abridge or alter rights of action or remedies existing in equity, the
common law, or statutory law. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-240 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
19. This date assumes that strict liability was created by Act of April 29, 1970, 1970
S.C. Acts 1157. But see supra note 14.
20. See supra note 17.
21. The court stated that "[w]here such 'no fault' liability is created after the fact,
only the clearest mandate from the Legislature should lead us to apply the statute retro-
actively." 290 S.C. at 507, 351 S.E.2d at 580. The court was concerned about the inequity
of holding "Carolina Chemicals in violation of a substantive liability which did not exist
at the time the containers were discarded," id. at 505, 351 S.E.2d at 579, when DHEC's
"own hearing officer determined Carolina Chemicals conformed to then existing statutes
and regulations when it disposed of the containers." Id. at 504, 351 S.E.2d at 579; see
also supra note 15.
22. Practitioners should note that Carolina Chemicals imposes liability on "one
who, directly or indirectly, controls or has a right to control the discharge." 290 S.C. at
503, 351 S.E.2d at 578. This liability is in no way limited to landowners who allow wastes
to be disposed on their property, as was the case with the Airport's liability in Carolina
Chemicals. Rather, it is likely that § 48-1-90, as interpreted by the court of appeals,
would impose liability on innocent subsequent purchasers, owners of waste disposal com-
panies, or even tenants who have the right to exclude trespassing covert waste disposers.
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